Sheryl Temaat is a free lance writer who has written articles for Homiletic and Pastoral Review about the annulment scandal in America. Her most recent article was Judging invalidity the American way. Copied below are some excerpts from Dignitas Connubii with Tamaat's comments following in italic.

1095.2 & 3, concerning capacity to consent and "lack of due discretion"

Art. 203.1  In causes concerning impotence or a defect of consent because of a mentis morbum (mental sickness or disease) or because of the incapacities described in can. 1095, the judge is to employ the assistance of one or more experts, unless from the circumstances this would appear evidently useless.  ([Temaat's note]As in he or she is obviously not in control of mental faculties, I would surmise this means.)
 
The experts, besides being required to adhere to the principles of Christian anthropology, are to be commended "for their religiosity and honesty."  Art. 205.1-2.
 
Art. 206  Experts can be excluded or exception can be taken to them.(write out your objections; i.e., this man/woman doesn't even believe in God).
 
Art. 209.1 In causes of incapacity, according to the understanding of can. 1095, the judge is not to omit asking the expert whether one or both parties suffered from a particular habitual or transitory anomaly at the time of the wedding; what was its seriousness; and when, from what cause and in what circumstances it originated and manifested itself.  (According to Fr. Wrenn, not liking any of the gifts he gave her was something she suffered from before the wedding.  But that anomaly did not surface until he actually gave her the gifts at various times during the marriage.  Judging Invalidity, lack of due competence, pp. 12-18)
 
Art. 209.2
    1 in causes of defectus usus rationis (defect in the use of reason), he is to ask whether the anomaly seriously disturbed the use of reason at the time of the celebration of the marriage; and with what intensity and by what symptoms it manifested itself;
 
   2 in causes of defectus discretionis iudicii (defect of discretionary judgement), he is to ask what was the effect of the anomaly on the critical and elective faculty for making serious decisions, particularly in freely choosing a state in life;
 
   3. finally, in causes of incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage, he is to ask what was the nature and gravity of the psychic cause on account of which the party would labour not only under a serious difficulty but even the impossibility of sustaining the actions inherent in the obligations of marriage.
 
   4. The expert. . .is to respond. . ..according to the precepts of his own art and science; he is to take care lest he exceed the limits of his task by giving forth judgements which pertain to the judge.  (He's not to comment on what pertains to God's domain over marriage.)
 
According to Fr. Wrenn (Judging Invalidity, lack of due discretion, pp. 12-18) this is the report of Philip Cotinga, M.D., the Court-appointed psychiatric expert:
 
"Diagnostically Melissa has, and had at the time of the wedding, a Major Depression and a moderate to severe Narcissistic Personality Disorder.
 
"All of this stems from her childhood and adolescence.  At the time of  the wedding she had definite abandonment issues concerning both her father who died, and her mother who turned her attention to another man.  Melissa, as a result, felt alone, and it was partly because of this that she picked up with Bradford.
 
"Melissa had very complicated motives in entering this marriage.  She was depressed and did not really love Bradford for himself but rather for what he could provide.  She then stayed with the marriage even though she was unhappy, because she could not accept defeat.  A defeat would be another black mark, and would cause her to become even more depressed.  She had lots of fears and was not equipped for intimacy.
 
"It is also clear that she relied on externals and on material things, which is typical of the narcissist, and that she engaged in narcissistic defenses, protecting herself by putting a hard shell around herself so that no one could get close to her.  She suffered from low self-esteem, self-absorption, and a need for attention and admiration.  She lacked empathy and feared intimacy but, at the same time, felt deprived of the love and affection that other couples had.  This feeling of deprivation, incidentally, is quite characteristic of the person with a Narcissistic Personality Disorder.  Such people tend to compare themselves to others, whom they always find happier.
 
"Melissa, in my judgment, is not really capable of loving a man.  She has very strong defenses against affection towards a man, and this has rendered her incapable of both giving and receiving love."
 

Article 35, §3.
With particular reason it is necessary that they  (Article 35, §1 "All who make up the tribunal or assist it must take an oath" (can. 1454)) study the jurisprudence of the Roman Rota, since it is responsible to promote the unity of jurisprudence and, through its own sentences, to be of assistance to the lower tribunals (cf. Pastor bonus, art. 126)

Art. 65.1  A judge, before he accepts a cause and whenever he perceives the hope of a good outcome, is to employ pastoral means to convince the spouses, if this can be done, to convalidate the marriage and reestablish conjugal life (can. 1676)
 
I would rewrite this to say: A judge, before he accepts a cause is to employ all means available, including what Jesus said about divorce and remarriage amounting to adultery, and adultery excluding one from heaven, to encourage the spouses to reestablish conjugal life.
 
"Whenever he perceives the hope of a good outcome," and "if this can be done" almost doom a good outcome before the words are out of a judge's mouth.  People think they can't do this hard stuff anymore.  But what they go on to do usually turns out worse than the first marriage.

Art. 75, Art. 111.  Punishments include a prohibition by the bishop from practicing in the tribunal.
Several sections refer to the punishments that judges and other ministers of the tribunal who commit offenses again the office entrusted to them

Art. 268.1  If in the grade of appeal a new ground of nullity is proposed, the tribunal can, as if in first instance, admit it, with due observance of artt. 114-126,135-137, and make a judgement concerning it (cf. can. 1683).
 
2.  For validity, however, the hearing of that new ground in the second or higher instance is preserved to a tribunal of the third or higher grade of trial.
 
3.  If a sentence in favour of the nullity of marriage on the basis of that new ground is given as if in first instance, the competent tribunal is to proceed in accordance with art. 265.1.
 
Since we have been informed that failure to follow proper procedures is the most common reason why the Rota overturns decrees of nullity from U.S. tribunals, it is very important that we be aware of those procedures and keep on top of them throughout the process.
 
The second reason is that the Rota doesn't accept the evidence for grounds like lack of due discretion, lack of due competence, and failure to form a communion of life that U.S. tribunals, shall we say, make up as they go.
 
  Art. 229.3  Therefore the judge by the same decree must permit the parties and their advocates to examine the acts not yet known to them, without prejudice to art. 230, at the chancery of the tribunal.

  Art. 230  In order to avoid very serious dangers, the judge can decree that some act is not to be shown to the parties, with due care taken however that the right of defense remains intact.

  Art. 231  The violation of the prescription given in art. 229.3 brings with it the remediable nullity of the sentence, but in a case in which the right of defense was actually denied it brings irremediable nullity (cf. can. 1598.1; 1620, n. 7; 1622, n.5).

  In other words, if a respondent wasn't shown the acts, the decree of nullity is null.  And that means that the marriage is valid.